The organizers of the seminar 30th annual meeting of the ICC Institute of World Business Law gave it the title Is arbitration only as good as the arbitrator? The French version of this title is even more explicit: Tant vaut l'arbitre, tant vaut l'arbitrage. This relationship should be nuanced. It is not totally true. Arbitrators are not alone in the arbitral process. They are dependent upon the attitude of the parties and their lawyers. The articles in this Dossier make reference to the arbitrators' freedom. This freedom is not unlimited. In many cases, arbitrators are bound by the parties' agreement on questions of procedure. In my opinion, the arbitration process can therefore only take place in a satisfactory manner if there is full cooperation and understanding between the arbitral panel and the parties' lawyers. I would therefore say: "Arbitration is as good as the arbitrator if counsel on both sides respects the arbitrator's authority and prerogatives."

Nowadays, there is a tendency in many seminars and conferences on arbitration to place the full responsibility for the length of arbitral procedures, or even of the alleged inefficiency of an increasing number of arbitrations, on the arbitral panel. I strongly object to this allegation.

Nobody can dispute that arbitration faces numerous challenges. It is true that many arbitral procedures are too long and too expensive and that a number of awards are not issued within reasonable time limits. This is not only or necessarily the arbitrator's responsibility. The parties' lawyers and even the arbitral institutions also have their share of responsibility. The time has probably come to fundamentally rethink the arbitral process, but this exceeds the scope of this Dossier and my concluding remarks. It will be the theme of numerous seminars that are presently in preparation. It is more than ever a highly relevant issue.

In any case, I consider unfortunate the increasing tendency of a number of lawyers to "limit the power of the arbitrators", according to an expression used by Serge Lazareff. These lawyers tend to pre-empt the arbitral procedure from the beginning by imposing their own version of the terms of reference and their own draft procedural orders, by deciding, without any consultation with the arbitral tribunal, to amend the procedural calendar and even by jointly deciding to postpone the hearings and to impose this decision on the arbitral panel. In addition, they increasingly fail to comply with the rules of procedure agreed upon at the beginning of the arbitration. This is not a good thing. Lawyers are in charge of their client's interests. Arbitrators must render justice. Neither are subordinate to the other. It is essential that all steps of the procedure are organized on the basis of full consultation between counsel and the arbitral tribunal. Unfortunately, this is not always the case today, at the expense of the efficiency of the arbitral process.

Antonias Dimolitsa argues that the arbitral panel must react strongly to all the violations that it encounters. Everybody will agree with this proposal, but every experienced arbitrator knows very well that saying is easier than doing.

William Park and Antonias Dimolitsa also rightly remind us of the various duties of the arbitrators. It is important to keep these duties in mind. An arbitrator must render a just award, and he must make sure that the process is equitable. To this end, he must listen to the parties without prejudice in favour of the party that appointed him, without prejudgement and with an open and independent mind. He must guarantee the integrity of the arbitral process, and this may go so far as excluding a party's counsel in exceptional cases. He must make sure that the arbitration is efficient in terms of time and cost. He must issue an award that is unquestionable and will be enforceable without difficulty. This implies that he will have to comply with the rules of public policy in force at the seat and that he will also have to act with prudence in the decisional process. For example, as the Paris Court of Appeal recently decided, an arbitrator may not requalify the parties' claims without giving them the opportunity to express themselves on the issue.

Several contributors draw attention to the pitfalls that an arbitrator has to avoid when fulfilling his various obligations and to the fact that complying with the above-mentioned duties may sometimes lead to contradictory conclusions.

In response to a question raised by Laurent Lévy, I therefore believe that arbitration remains an art that requires a lot of talent, flexibility, good common sense, psychology and diplomacy, as well as a sense of management and a natural inclination to be decisive and firm whenever needed, even at the risk of making oneself unpopular in the eyes of the parties. This is how an arbitrator's talent and independence is recognized. It is this complex cocktail of qualities that makes an arbitrator a good arbitrator.

In a world of procedure that has become more and more complex, arbitrators need, more than ever, to be efficiently assisted at the administrative level. As Alexis Mourre reminds us, there is an inequality between the arbitral panel and counsel: a maximum of three arbitrators versus armies of well-equipped lawyers who inundate the panel with long submissions and mountains of documents. This is where the great importance of an administrative secretary becomes apparent. In today's arbitration, the administrative secretary should not be considered a symptom of the above-mentioned complexity. rather, the secretary is a guarantee that the panel will have the necessary administrative assistance to concentrate on essential matters, such as its jurisdictional function and the rendering of an award within the required time limit. It remains true that the recourse to an administrative secretary must take place with full transparency and in compliance with the fundamental principle that the arbitrator's jurisdictional function may not be delegated to a person who does not possess this quality.

Various contributors mention the multiplication of arbitration guidelines, directives and codes of conduct of all kinds. However, it is not certain that this plethora of instruments leads to a more efficient arbitration procedure.

A few years ago, ICC adopted guidelines for reducing time and costs in arbitration. Conscientious arbitrators are committed to these guidelines. Unfortunately, in many cases, the parties are reluctant to apply them. It often happens that lawyers - some of whom were strong supporters of the guidelines during the working sessions of the ICC International Arbitration Commission - refuse to comply with them from the start of the first procedural hearing. Their argument is always the same: the specificity or unique character of 'their' case.

One may entertain similar doubts in relation to the recent blossoming of proposals for ethical rules for arbitrators and rules of good conduct for counsel in international arbitration. It is to be hoped that these proposals are not merely marketing initiatives aimed at promoting the reputation of their initiators as the 'good guys' of arbitration. These proposals, if they are sincere and well intentioned, are necessary and arrive at the right time. I share the opinion of many lawyers that there has been a loss of ethics in international arbitration. This may be due to the significant increase in international arbitration in recent years, in particular in countries that do not have any tradition and experience of the process, as well as to the arrival in arbitral procedures of new, inexperienced players. The adoption by arbitral institutions of binding rules of ethics and good conduct is therefore undoubtedly a welcome initiative, but it still gives rise to problems, such as how to determine what sanctions would be efficient in case of non-compliance with these rules and how such sanctions might be enforced.